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For a multi-level hierarchical differential game governed by a linear equation 
with quadratic payoffs, the closed-loop representation for the open-loop 
Stackelberg strategies is derived via a Riccati type equation. Existence and 
uniqueness of solutions to such a Riccati equation is established. 0 1991 Academic 
Press, Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Let us start with the statement of our hierarchical differential game. Let 
T>O be a given constant and N be a positive integer. We consider the 
linear system 
i(t)=AX(t)+ F BiUi(t)y a.e. t E [0, T], 
i= 1 
(1.1) 
x(0) = x0. 
In the above, x(t) E R” is the state of the system at time t, ui( .), IF-valued 
function, is the control taken by the ith player, while A and Bis are 
matrices of proper orders. Thus, (1.1) is a system for an N-person differen- 
tial game. We let the payoff for the ith player be 
<W,x(T),x(T))+~~[(QiX(t),X(t))+(Riui(f),ui(f))ldt), 
0 
(1.2) 
where Wi, Qi, and Ri are self-adjoint matrices of proper orders and ( ., . ) 
is the inner product in the proper spaces R” or IX”: which can be identified 
from the context. 
l This work was partially supported by the Chinese NSF under Grant 0188416. 
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Now let us explain our hierarchical differential game. First of all, the 
leader-follower order is settled as follows: The ith player is a leader of the 
(i - 1) th player and is a follower of the (i + 1) th player ( 1~ i < N) and the 
Nth player is the leader at the top level and the 1 st player is the follower 
at the bottom level. More precisely, if we denote 
42;= L'(O, T; UP), 
then all the players want to minimize their own payoffs subject to the 
leader-follower order stated above in the following way: 
For given ui( .) E si, 2 < i < N, player 1 tries to find a control 
li,=ti,[u, )..., U,]E%,, 
such that 
J,(fi,, u2, . . . . u,)= inf Jl(u,, u2, . . . . ~4~). 
we% 
(1.3) 
Suppose such a tir exists. Then, player 2 tries to find a control 
22, z li*[zQ, . ..) UN] E 422 
such that for 
92@4*, .-., UN) = Jl(filCUZ, . . . . u,l, u2, .a*, UN), 
one has 
j,(ti 2, ..., uN) = inf J2(u2, . . . . uN). (1.4) we% 
We can define ti,, . . . . 8, inductively, if they exist. In the case 
Ijl E ti,[u*, . ..) UN], 
222 = fi2[Uj, . . . . UN], 
(1.5) 
exists, we refer (1.5) as an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium for our 
hierarchical differential game. 
In the case N = 2, the above game is usually referred to as the 
Stackelberg differential game. We refer the readers to [ 1, 2, 7, 8, 
15, 17, 18, 20-24, 261 for the Stackelberg and multi-level hierarchical 
differential games. It should be pointed out that in all the works related to 
the closed-loop representation of the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium, 
the corresponding Riccati equation and the form of the feedback controls 
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were not given for general N> 3 and, most important, existence of solu- 
tions to the Riccati equation (even for N= 2) was not given. 
The purpose of this paper is to till the gaps left by other authors. 
Namely, we obtain the existence and uniqueness of the open-loop 
Stackelberg equilibrium, find a closed-loop representation of such an equi- 
librium through a Riccati type equation and establish the existence and 
uniqueness of the derived Riccati type equation. Then, the N-level 
hierarchical differential game governed by linear differential equations with 
quadratic payoffs is completely solved. 
The existence and uniqueness of the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium 
are not hard to obtain. To get the closed-loop representation via a Riccati 
type equation, we need a result about a linear quadratic optimal control 
problem with mixed initial and terminal states. Then, we rearrange the 
auxiliary states so that the induction applies and the Nth closed-loop 
system can be derived. We then obtain a nonsymmetric Riccati equation. 
To solve this equation, we adopt a result of [6] to show the equivalence 
between such a Riccati equation and a Fredholm integral equation, the 
existence of a solution to which can be obtained under some mild condi- 
tions. These conditions cover the so-called Hamiltonian conditions. 
Since the method used in this paper is basically the calculation of linear 
operators in some Hilbert spaces, one can see that all the results in this 
paper extend to the similar problem in Hilbert spaces. In that situation, the 
differential Riccati equation is replaced by the integral type Riccati 
equation [6, 131. The existence of solutions to this equation can also be 
obtained by similar methods. Also, we should note that all the results 
extend to non-autonomous cases. 
We refer the readers to [4, 11, 13, 141 for classical two-player zero-sum 
differential games, and to [3, 5,9, 10, 16, 19,25,27] for N-player differen- 
tial games with the discussion of Nash equilibrium. 
2. MAIN RESULTS 
In this section, we state the main results of this paper. To this end, let 
us first introduce some notations. For SE [0, T] fixed, let 
fCS)* L2(s T- W) + L2(s * 9, T W) 3, 9 
(f(“z)(l)=I:e”‘“‘r(r)aL, 
(2.1) 
Vte [s, T-J, z(.)eL2(s, T; R”). 
I-$‘: L2(s, T; W) --) R”, 
f:“‘z = (f’“‘z)(T) +A(T--r)~(~) dz, 
(2.2) 
Vz( -) E L2(s, T; W). 
s 
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Then, it is easy to see that [13] 
r(‘)*: L2(s, T, R”) -+ L2(s, T; W), 
(P’z)(t) = jTeA*(‘()z(T) dz, 
(2.3) 
b’t E Cs, Tl, z( .) E L*(s, T; W). 
, 
r&Q*: [w” --+ L*(s, T; R”), 
(2.4) 
pyx,=eA”T-“x,, Qt E CO, Tl, xg E R”. 
Next, we let (assuming the following are well-defined) 
&“‘= n (I+ fi,l”’ yj”‘) 
[ 1 -I Bi, (2.5) j=l 
@(“’ = R. + B(“‘* I@‘@“’ I I I I,) 1 <i<N. 
For the case s=O, we simply suppress the superscripts (s) in the above. 
Next, we denote 
andfor l<i<N-1, 
kPi+l= 
Pi 0 
DC Wi + I 1 ) - J@? (21 x 2’).block 
1 
Oi+’ = (DC:;+ 11 -;: > (2’x2’)-block 
A&+1= $i DI”i+I1 
0 -fi* (2’ x 2%block’ 
where for any (n x n)-matrix or operator from L2(.s, T, W) to itself S, 
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the order of which can be determined from the context. We also let 
jN= uvl,) 
[9,1ij= i ;? j=2’, 2’, . . . . 2N-1, 
3 je (0, 1,2, . . . . 2N-- 1}\{20,2l, . ..) 2N-‘). 
Now, let us state our main results. 
THEOREM 2.1. Let Qi be well-defined and 
Gi>O, l,<i<N. (2.6) 
Then, there exists a unique open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium for our N-level 
hierarchical differential game (1.1 )-( 1.2). Moreover, ifgN( .) is a solution of 
the Riccati equation 
-&(t)+&li,(t)+&(t)& 
+&-~~(t)&&,(t)=o, tE CO, Tl, (2.7) 
RN(T)= @N, 
then, the unique Stackelberg equilibrium strategy can be put into the feed- 
back form, 
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where eN( .,.) is the fundamental matrix corresponding to the linear system 
with the coefficient matrix 
THEOREM 2.2. Let @pi”) be well-defined for all 1 <i<N and SE [IO, T] 
and 
@{“’ > 0, l<i<N, SE [0, T]. (2.9) 
Then, problem (2.7) admits a unique solution k,,,( . ). 
It appears that the conditions imposed in Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 are not 
easy to check. However, the following corollary gives us a satisfactory case 
covered by the above. 
COROLLARY 2.3. Let the so-called Hamiltonian conditions hold: 
wi, Qi>Ov R,>O, l<ibN. (2.10) 
Then, the conditions of Theorem 2.2 hold and thus the conclusions of 
Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 hold. 
It is interesting to ask whether (2.6) and (2.9) are equivalent. It is not 
hard to show that these two are equivalent for i= 1. Also, we can find some 
particular examples, for which (2.10) does not hold, such that (2.6) and 
(2.9) are equivalent for i= 2. However, it is left open whether this is the 
case in general. 
3. SOME PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
In this section, we present some preliminary results, which will be 
necessary in the sequel. Some of these results have their own interest. 
First of all we state the following standard result [12]. 
LEMMA 3.1. Let X and Y be Banach spaces, S, E 9(X, Y) and 
Sz E 9( Y, X). Then, I,+ S2S, is invertible if and only if I, + SISz is 
invertible. In this case. one has 
(zx+s,sl)-‘=z,-s,(I,+s,s*)-‘sl. (3.1) 
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Next, we consider a non-standard linear quadratic optimal control 
problem. Let X and U be two real Euclidean spaces, A, AI, Q, W, Q,, 
W, E Y(X) with Q0 and W, being symmetric, BE 9( U, X), R,, E 9( U) 
with R, being positive definite, and f(. ) E L’(O, T; X). Let r and Tr be 
defined similar to (2.1) and (2.2) with s=O. Let 
!Po = Z-F WJT+ T*QJ, 
Y=rT;Fwr,+r*Qr. (3.2) 
Suppose that 
I+ YA4 is invertible. (3.3) 
Then, by Lemma 3.1, we know that 
BE (Z+M!?‘)-‘B (3.4) 
is well-defined. We further assume that 
a,,-R,+B*!&B>O. (3.5) 
Then, we consider the following linear quadratic optimal control problem: 
Minimize J(U) = f ( ( W,x( T), x(T)) 
+ j’ L-<Qox(t), x(t)) + (Rou(t), u(t)>1 dt 
0 
subject to 
~(;r~:;>=(“, -T*> ;i:;> (3.6) 
+(~)u(t)+(fbt)), a.e. tE[O, T], 
40) =x0, 
Wx(T)+y(T)=O. 
We note that the above is a linear quadratic optimal control problem with 
mixed initial and terminal states. We have the following 
LEMMA 3.2. Let conditions (3.3) (3.5) hold. Let a( -) be an optimal 
control for problem (3.6) and (a( ’ ), 9( .)) be the corresponding optimal 
trajectory. Then, there exist q( . ), $(. ) E C( [0, T]; X), such that 
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Z(t) f(t) P(f) 0 uu (3.7) x jyt) + 0 ’ ad?. t E [lo, T], ti(t) 0 
(; -b*)(i) m+(i) (T)=O, 
z2( t) = R, ‘B*ll/( t), tE [O, T]. 
ProofY From the system in (3.6), we have, by the variation of constant 
formula, 
Thus, 
which 
Then, 
x = eA’xo + T(My + Bu + f). 
y=r;y(T)-r*Qx 
= -!Z’My-(T:W, r*Q) x0- Y(Bu+f), 
implies 
y= -(I+ 'PM)-' 
(3.6) becomes 
Minimize J(U) 
subject to 
i(t)=Ax(t)+(Bu)(t)+jyt), 
-40) =x0, 
a.e. t E [0, T], 
with B given by (3.4) and 
y(t) =f(t)-M (I+ !Z’M)-’ [(I-lt;w, Z’*Q) 
{ 
x(~:)xo-Yfl]w, tECO>n. 
(3.8) 
(3.9) 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
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Here, we have used the fact 
[Z-M(Z+ YM)-’ Y]B=(Z+MY)-‘B=& 
Then, 
x=eA.x,+TBu+r~ 
and 
J(u)=~{(~,u,u)+2(Bu,r~W,(eATx,+rTJL) 
(3.12) 
+ T*Qo(eA’x,, + r’)) 
+ ( Wo(eATx, + r,fi, eATx, + r,f) 
+ ( Qo(eA’xo + ry), eAk,, + rT)>. 
(3.13) 
Then, by the optimality of li, we obtain 
@& = -B*{r; Wo(eArx,, + rr3) + r*Qo(eA’x,, + ry)}. (3.14) 
Thus, by the definition of Q0 and !PO and (3.12), we have 
ztoqt)= -8*{r~w,a(T)+r*Q,f(.)} (t), tE [O, T]. (3.15) 
Next, we set 
e(t)= - {(I+ Y*M*)-1 Cr;fw,a(T)+r*Q,f(.)l(t)}, t E L-0, T]. 
cp(t) =- mf*wo, 
(3.16) 
Then, it is easy to check that (3.7) holds. 
Next, for 1 < ii N and s E [0, TJ, we let 
rp L~($, T; P’n) -+ L+, T; up-‘y, 
(rjsk)(t) =I’ eAi(‘-‘)z(~) &, 
(3.17) 
v2( . ) E L~(~, T;P’y, s 
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and for 1 <idN- 1, we let 
bps', O,r+, = fj;;D[ Wi+ 1] Z-i:;+ f is'*D[Qi+ 1] Z-i"', (3.20) 
~~~,=(z+$pp!~‘)-’ I 1 (3.21) 
and 
&‘= B,, lp’b”‘l = I@’ = y/y - . (3.22) 
We know that for optimal control problem with Bolza type cost func- 
tional, if the terminal state is free, then, in the maximum principle, the 
constant JI” can be taken as -1. However, it is not true, in general, if 
the terminal state is constrained. The above result actually says that for 
the above case in which the initial and terminal states are jointly constrained 
in a particular form, we still can take I,$” to be - 1. This fact was used in 
[lS], but no proof was given. The following lemma is crucial in the proof 
of our main results. 
LEMMA 3.3. Let SE [0, T] be given such that @I”’ is well-defined as in 
(2.5) and 
@ I”’ > 0, 1 <i<N. (3.23) 
Then, for all i = 1, 2, . . . . N, the operators I+ @is’Ai are invertible. Moreover, 
R.+j!“‘*‘@$!“‘>() I I 9 I 3 lbi<N. (3.24) 
Proof. Without loss of generality, we let s =0 and supress the super- 
scripts. For simplicity, in what follows, we let [S] 1 1 be the (n x n)-block at 
the left upper corner of the (n x n)-block matrix S, i.e., 
s=( E”:: ::;:I ;y ). 
We use the induction to prove the fact, 
[(z+AiPi)-‘]ll= ) 
1 <id N- 1. (3.25) 
Z+ @i&i is invertible, 
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For i= 1, we have that 
A&=B,R,B~*=& 
P, =rpv,r,,T+r:&,r, = Y,. 
Thus, by Lemma 3.1, 
(3.26) 
Z+fi,!&=Z+B,R;,B:Y, 
is invertible if and only if 
is invertible, which is ensured by (3.23). Then, by (3.26), we see that (3.25) 
holds for i= 1. Now, let (3.25) hold for i= 1,2, . . . . j. We prove (3.25) for 
1-t !Pj+1tij+l= 
z+ !Rjliaj @jDCMj+ 11 
D[Yj+,]dj Z+D[Yj+,Mj+,] + @Tdj* . 
(3.27) 
(3.28) 
(3.29) 
Since Z+ ej&lj is invertible, by the above, we have that Z+ pj+, fij+, is 
invertible if and only if the following is invertible: 
I+ D[ Yj+, Mj+ ,] + @T&F - D[ Yj+ ,] fij(Z+ ej&fj)-, ejD[Mj+ ,] 
=Z+D[Yj+,Mj+,]+ @+I&+ 
-D[Yj+,](Z-(Z+&Pj)-‘)D[Mj+,] 
= (I+ !Ql@~){z+ [(z+i12j!P-j)-1]* 
X D[Yj+ ,](I+ Il;ri’Pj)-’ D[Mj+ ,I}* (3.30) 
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We note that D[Mj+ r] = D[M,+ r]D[Z]. Thus, the above is invertible if 
and only if (by Lemma 3.1 and (3.25) for i = j) 
z+D[z][(z+~j!Pj)-‘]*D[Yj+,](z+tij!Pj)-iD[Mj+*] 
= 
( 
Z+[(Z+tij@j)-l]~lYj+l[(z+tijp~)-l],lMj+l 0 
0 Z > 
= 
( 
z+{CIYIj,=l (z+n/cyk)l-l}* yj+llIn’,=l (z+fikyVk)l-lMj+l O 
0 Z > 
(3.31) 
is invertible, which is equivalent to the invertability of the left upper corner 
block. Again by Lemma 3.1, we know that this is the same as the invert- 
ability of 
Z+yj+l fi (Z+lQi-i,Y ) 
L k=l 
k]~lMj+l{[~l(z+~kyk)]~l~* 
=I+ Yj+l&+lR,:;lfi;+l 
=I+ Yj+,nj+,. 
Since Qj+ , is invertible, by Lemma 3.1, we know that the above is 
invertible and we have proved the invertability of Z + ej+, kj+, . Now, 
we consider 
zftij+,@j+l= z+tij@j++[Mj+lYj+l] -D[Mj+l]@~ 
-tip[Yj+,] 
(3.32) 
Then, by Lemma 3.1, 
= Z+lGj@Pj+D[Mj+l](Z+ @TfiF)-’ D[yj+l] 
( 
0 
-A2~D[Yj+,,] I+ Aq!P~ > 
E s. 
(3.33) 
Thus, 
(z+aj+19j+1)-1 
=spl z D[M,+,] !PJZ+h?~!P/y 
0 Z > 
= {z+~j@j+DIMj+l](Z+ !P~fi~)-‘D[Yj+*]}-’ 
( 
* 
> 
(3.34) * * ’ 
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where the *‘s stand for the entries that do not concern us. Furthermore, 
(z+~j~.++[Mj+,J(z+~~rjl,*)-lDIYj+,]}-’ 
= {I+ (z+A2j!Pj)-1 D[M,+ *](Z+ !Pp2~)-’ 
XD[Yj+l]}-l (Z+lQj@j)-’ (3.35) 
= 
t 
(I+ [(Z+~j~j)-l]llMj+l[(z+ @~kj*)-llll yj+l}-l 
x [(I+ A2j lij)-‘111 
* 
* * 1. 
Again, the *‘s are the entries not concerning us. Hence, by the induction 
assumption, we have 
j+l 
n (I+&&) -‘. 
A=1 1 (3.36) 
This completes the induction and our lemma is proved. 
4. PROOF OF THE MAIN RESULTS 
In this section, we present a proof of our results stated in Section 2. We 
let (al, ii2, . . . . ti,) be the Stackelberg equilibrium, For convenience, we let 
the corresponding optimal trajectory be 
zo( . ) = a(. ). (4.1) 
Denote 
(4.2) 
We consider the system 
lo(f) = Ax,(t) + 4%(t) +f,(t), 
x,(O) =x0, 
a.e. t E [0, T], 
(4.3) 
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and the cost functional 
m=~ (~lXO(~)~XO(~)) 
i 
+ s oT C<Qlxo(t), x0(t)> + <R,u,(f), u,(t))1 df]. (4.4) 
This is a standard linear quadratic optimal control problem. By the 
uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium, the optimal control is ri, and 
thus the corresponding optimal trajectory is a( .) =zO( .). Then, by the 
standard Maximum principle, we can find a function zr( .), such that the 
closed loop system reads 
a.e. t E [IO, T], 
z,(O) = x0, 
~,zo(~)+z,(~)=O, 
z&(t) = R,‘Bfz,(t), t E [O, T-J. 
Next, we set 
fi(.)= 5 B&k(.). 
k=3 
And consider the following system 
i(;:I:I)=(,“, -2*)(;:3 
+(:)u2(l)+rr)), a.e. tE[O, T], 
x,(O) =x0, 
W,x1(T)+ Yl(n=o> 
with cost functional 
j2(u2)=; <W,x,(n x,(7-)) 
1 
+ j’ C<Qzx,(t) 2 xl(t)> + (&df), dt))l dt 
0 
(4.5) 
(4.6) 
(4.7) 
(4.8) 
409/161/2-16 
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Again, by the uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium, the optimal 
control exists and is ti,. Thus, the optimal trajectory is (zO( +), zl( .)). By 
Lemma 3.3, I+ 6,fii is invertible; i.e., the conditions of Lemma 3.2 hold. 
Hence, there exists a pair (z2( .), zJ .)), such that the closed-loop system 
reads 
a.e. t E [0, T], 
(4.9) 
ii,(t)= R,‘B,*z,(t), tE [O, T]. 
If we set 
then, in (4.9), substituting the last relation into the first, we have 
+(:) d3(t)+rAf)), a.e. IE [0, r], 
(4.10) 
A HIERARCHICAL DIFFERENTIAL GAME 537 
which is very similar to (4.7). Thus, we may consider the system 
+(:) ~,(t)+(~~f’), a.e. tfz [0, T], 
x*(O)= “0” 7 0 
~*x,(~)+.Y2(~)=0, (4.11) 
with the cost functional 
j,(h)=; (NW31 x2(t), X2(n) 
1 
+ 1’ CWQJ -4th x2(f)) + (R3~3(t), u3(9>1 dt (4.12) 
0 
By Lemma 3.3, we know that I+ ez&f, is invertible and thus Lemma 3.2 
applies again. It is clear that the procedure can be continued up to N. 
Now, we write the Nth closed-loop system. To this end, we introduce the 
following notation. For any index set 9 = {CC,, q, . . . . uk}, we denote 
Z 
(Zj,jEJ+ 
0 
F . 
Z wt 
We let 
~‘N’={1,2)u{2i,2i+1,...,2i+2i~1-1,0GdN-1}, N32, 
w= (l}, b(*)= { 1,2}, 
XCN)= {O, 1,2, . ..) 2N- l}\P’, nal 
and 
cp(t)=(Zj(t), jeY’N’), 
l)(t) = (Zj(l), jE 3’N’), 
(4.13) 
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Then, our Nth closed-loop system reads 
and 
(4.14) 
0 . . . 0 
R-‘B* 2 2 . . . 0 : * (4.15) . . 0 i .._ R-‘B* N N 
From (4.14) and (2.7), one can easily obtain that 
-$ (titt) + RN(t) tht)) 
= (-A; + kN(t) AN)(,ht) + RN(t) dt)), 
and 
Thus, it follows that 
IC/tt) = - gN(t) dt), t E [O, T]. 
Hence, by (4.14), we have 
dt) = t2N - fiNkN(f)) dt), a.e. t E [0, T], 
(4.16) 
(4.17) 
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We note that 
i(t) v(t)= 9(t) > ( > 
(4.18) 
where a( .) is the optimal trajectory corresponding to the Stackelberg 
strategy (li, ,fi 2, . . . . tiN). Thus, (4.17) gives 
)=(O z,,,-I_,,,)CAIN-l-~N~N(t)l (z(,N-:e ,,,) .9(t) 
Ill 
- (0 zp-i-,)“) &&v(t) o i(t) 
0 
j(O) = 0. 
Thus, by the definition of &t, r), we have 
j(t) = -J’ G(t, r)(O IQ-l _ ,,J &&v(t) 
0 
Ill 
x 0 0 
i(z) dz, tE [O, r-j. 
Next, we define 
CJvlij= {;? 9 
Then, one has 
(4.19) 
(4.20) 
(4.21) 
Thus, (2.8) follows from (4.15), (4.18), (4.20), and (4.21). Hence the proof 
of Theorem 2.1 is completed. Next, we prove Theorem 2.2. To this end, we 
need an equivalent theorem. Consider the following Riccati equation: 
~K(r)+A,(t)*K(r)+K(t)~*(t) 
-K(t) M(t) K(t) + Q(t) = 0, tE [IO, n (4.22) 
K(T)= w. 
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Let QI(t, s) and @Jt, s) be the evolution operator generated by A r( .) and 
A*(. ), respectively, i.e., (i = 1, 2) 
(4.23) 
We let 
x Q(o) @do, 7) do t, 7 E [O, T]. (4.24) 
Then, we introduce the following family of Fredholm integral equations: 
For SE [O, T], 
H(t, s) + j-T V(t, 7) M(7) H(7, s) d7 = V(t, s), ZE [s, T]. (4.25) 
s 
we have the following equivalence result for (4.22) and (4.25): 
THEOREM 4.1. (i) If (4.22) admits a solution, then for any SE [0, T], 
(4.25) has a solution. 
(ii) Zffor any SE [0, T], (4.25) admits a unique solution, then (4.22) 
has a solution. 
This theorem is due to S. Chen [6]. The proof presented here is a little 
different. 
Proof: (i) Let K( .) be a solution of (4.22). We let G(t, s) be the 
fundamental matrix of the linear differential equation with the coefficient 
matrix A*(t) - M(t) K(t). Then, we set 
Wt, s) = K(t) G(t, ~1, O<s<t<T. (4.26) 
Some direct computation shows that 
; H(t, s) = -A,(t)* ff(t, s) - Q(t) G(t, s), O<s<t,<T. (4.27) 
Thus, 
H(t, s)=@,(T, t)* WG(T, s)+l’@,(r, t)* 
I 
x Q(7) (37, s) d7, O<s<t<T. (4.28) 
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On the other hand, from 
; G(f, s) = A,(t) G(t, s) - M(f) K(t) G(t, s), 
G(s, s) = Z, 
(4.29) 
and (4.26) we have 
G(~,s)=(P~(~,s)-~‘@~(~,~)M(~)ZZ(T,S)~T, O<s<t<T. 
3 
Thus, substituting (4.30) into (4.28), we obtain 
H(t,s)=@,(T, t)* W ~,(T,s)--II$,(T,r)M(r)H(r,s)d?] 
s 
rT l- l-7 
(4.30) 
7 
+ J 
t 
@,(z, t)* Q(T) L%(T, s) - J 
s 
@AT, a) M(o) WC, s) do] dz 
= V(t, s) - j’ V(t, 5) M(z) H(z, s) ds. 
s 
That is H(t, S) defined by (4.26) is a solution of (4.25). 
(ii) Let H( ., s) be the unique solution of (4.25) (for given s E [0, T]). 
Then, we first claim that 
; H(t, s) + H(t, s) AJS)-H(t, s) M(s) z-z(s, s) =o, O<s<t<T. 
(4.31) 
In fact, by (4.24) and (4.25), with some computation, we have 
f wt, s) + ff(t, s) A,(s) - ff(t, s) M(s) J-m, s) 
I 
T 
=- ut, z) M(z) 
s 
x 
[ 
$ H(z, s) + H(z, s) A*(S) - H(7, s) M(s) H(s, s) 1 dT. 
Thus, by the uniqueness of the solutions of (4.25) (for any given 
s E [0, T] ), we obtain (4.31). Next, we let 
K(t) = mt, t), t E [0, T]. (4.32) 
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Then, by some straightforward computation, we end up with 
$x(r)= -A,(t)* K(t)-K(t)A,(t)+K(t)M(t)K(t)-Q(t) 
s T - vt, 7) M(z) f 
a H(z, t) + H(z, t) A*(t) - H(z, t) M(t) H(t, t) 1 dz 
= -A,(t)*K(t)-K(t)A,(t)+K(t)M(t)K(t)-Q(t), 
t E [O, T]. 
Thus, K(t) defined by (4.32) is a solution of (4.22). 
Now, we return to Eq. (2.8). By Theorem 4.1, we only need to prove that 
for any given SE [O, T], the equation 
fi(t, s) + j-’ I$, z) ti,Z?(r, s) dz = p((t, s), s<t<T, (4.33) 
s 
has a unique solution, where 
V( t, s) = e AfiT--r)fi eAN(T--s) N 
+i= 
eA&(-t) ” 
QNZ 9 AN(r--s’ dz 0 < s, t < T. (4.34) 
S”f 
While, for any h( . ) E L*(s, T; lR2N-‘n), we have 
f 
T 
p( -, 5) &,Th(r) dz 
s 
By Lemma 3.3, Z+ !@uN is invertible. Thus, (4.33) has a unique solution 
and we have proved our Theorem 2.2. 
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